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INTRODUCTION
Wage-and-hour class actions are by far the most common type of
class action claim filed in federal court, accounting for nearly 20 per-
cent of all class action suits.' Employees bring wage-and-hour class
actions to recover unpaid wages. The stakes are high. Employers pay
out at least $1 billion annually in these cases.2 Wal-Mart recently set-
tled sixty-three wage-and-hour class action suits for an estimated $342
to $640 million and still has another twelve suits pending.3 Even with
this large volume of litigation, a fundamental question remains un-
answered: does state or federal law determine the remedies available
and the procedures used in these suits?'
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938' (FLSA) requires employers
to pay a minimum wage and overtime rates. It contains a savings clause,
which permits states to set more stringent wage-and-hour laws, creating
situations in which both state and federal law may apply. In addition,
the FLSA contains enforcement provisions detailing how employees
may bring claims to recover unpaid wages as well as the remedies they
may seek. These enforcement provisions create a private right of ac-
tion and allow the United States Department of Labor to initiate pub-
lic enforcement actions. But, the FLSA does not specify whether
f BS 2006, University of Illinois; JD Candidate 2010, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 Marc H. Harwell and Mary DeCamp, Class Action Issues in a Wage and Hour Discrimi-
nation Context, 58 Federation Def & Corp Counsel Q 269,269-71 (Spring 2008).
2 See Michael Orey, Wage Wars, Business Week (Oct 1, 2007), online at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_40/b4052001.htm (visited Sept 1, 2009)
(documenting the growth in wage-and-hour class actions).
3 Steven Greenhouse and Stephanie Rosenbloom, Wal-Mart Settles 63 Lawsuits over
Wages, NY Times B1 (Dec 24,2008).
4 See Bouaphakeo v Tyson Foods, Inc, 564 F Supp 2d 870,885-86 (ND Iowa 2008) (noting
conflicting case law regarding the preemption of state law claims).
5 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), Pub L No 75-718, 52 Stat 1060, codified as
amended at 29 USC § 201 et seq.
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states may determine their own enforcement schemes for wage-and-
hour law violations.
With the dramatic rise in FLSA claims over the last decade,
courts frequently face wage-and-hour suits containing a FLSA claim
and several state law claims. Often, state law provides remedies and
procedures that are more favorable to employees than the FLSA en-
forcement provisions. Sometimes these differences can be very favor-
able by providing treble damages or changing the class action proce-
dures. Employers often argue these employee-friendly state law claims
are preempted: since Congress provided specific enforcement provi-
sions, it intended these federal enforcement provisions to be used in-
stead of state enforcement provisions. Allowing state law claims would
frustrate congressional intent, and therefore, those claims should be
preempted. Courts have struggled with this question and have issued
conflicting opinions.
This Comment resolves these issues. Part I outlines the federal
and state statutory background. Part II explains how state law claims
may be preempted by subdividing the issue into three categories de-
pending on whether the state wage-and-hour law is: (1) stricter than
the FLSA, (2) coextensive with the FLSA, or (3) nonexistent. Part III
summarizes the current conflicting case law on FLSA preemption.
Part IV begins by demonstrating that the traditional method of
preemption analysis (determining whether Congress intended to
preempt state law) does not decisively resolve the issue. Part IV then
argues for a presumption against preemption in this context because
states have traditionally regulated wages and hours, and continue to
do so. Further, Part IV applies this proposed presumption to the three
preemption categories outlined in Part II. Whenever there is ambiguity,
the presumption against preemption wins out, meaning that state law
claims should be preempted only if the state does not have a state wage-
and-hour law. Finally, Part IV applies this approach to the case law.
I. FEDERAL AND STATE LAW BACKGROUND
A. Federal Statutes
Congress enacted the FLSA to remedy labor conditions deemed
"detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers."7
To do so, the Act requires employers to pay minimum wages and over-
6 See Bouaphakeo, 564 F Supp 2d at 885-86.
7 29 USC § 202.
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time, and prohibits child labor.' The Act makes clear that these are
minimum standards (at least for wages and overtime): states can enact
stricter regulations.9 Besides its substantive regulations, the Act also
contains broad enforcement provisions, which specify the remedies
available and the procedures used to bring suit under the Act."
The Act was passed primarily out of concern for employees' liv-
ing and working conditions." President Franklin D. Roosevelt urged
Congress to pass the Act to give workers "a fair day's pay for a fair
day's work."'2 The Supreme Court confirmed that this is the Act's
principal purpose, distinguishing it from other labor laws aimed at
striking a balance between employee and employer interests.' But the
Act did not intend to increase wages at all costs. It is also clear that
Congress at least considered the economic effect of these minimum
wage-and-hour regulations on the labor market." In lengthy joint
House and Senate hearings on the bill, numerous experts testified on
its potential adverse economic effects, such as an increase in the cost
of living for farmers because they did not receive a corresponding
wage increase under the Act."
The substantive provisions of the Act are straightforward. The
two that are used most often are the minimum wage and overtime
provisions. The minimum wage provision requires that employees re-
ceive at least a set dollar amount per hour worked.'" The overtime
provision requires employers to pay overtime rates (one-and-a-half
times regular pay) for any hours worked in excess of forty in a single
week.'7 But, both of these provisions are subject to numerous exemp-
8 29 USC §§ 206-07,212.
9 29 USC § 218(a).
10 29 USC § 216(a)-(b).
11 For a detailed description of the year-long legislative process leading to the passage of
the FLSA, see John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 L & Con-
temp Probs 464,464-73 (1939).
12 Franklin D. Roosevelt, 6 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: The
Constitution Prevails, 1937 210 (Russell & Russell 1941).
13 See Barrentine v Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc, 450 US 728, 739 (1981), quoting
Overnight Motor Transportation Co v Missel, 316 US 572, 578 (1942) (distinguishing the FLSA
from the Labor Management Relations Act, which was "designed to minimize industrial strife
and to improve working conditions") (emphasis added).
14 See 29 USC § 202 ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act ... to correct and as
rapidly as practicable to eliminate the [substandard labor] conditions ... in such industries with-
out substantially curtailing employment or earning power.").
15 Forsythe, 6 L & Contemp Probs at 467-69 (cited in note 11).
16 See U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability
Appropriations Act, 2007 § 8102, Pub L No 110-028, 121 Stat 112, 188, codified at 29 USC § 206.
The minimum wage is $7.25 as of July 24, 2009. See also Compliance Assistance-Fair Labor
Standards Act, online at http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/flsa (visited Sept 1, 2009).
17 29USC § 207.
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tions. For example, employees acting in an executive, administrative,
or professional capacity are exempted from both the minimum wage
and overtime provisions of the Act." The Act also entirely exempts
certain industries from its provisions, such as seamen." Extensive regu-
lations issued by the Department of Labor clarify these exemptions."
Because the regulations are complex and situation specific, employers
are often sued for misclassifying employees, and this drives much of
the FLSA litigation.21
When an employer violates one of these substantive provisions,
the FLSA provides employees with specific remedies. Employees may
recover the unpaid wages, an extra amount equal to the unpaid wages
(liquidated damages), and attorneys' fees and costs." The Act, as
amended, also specifies procedures employees must use to bring
FLSA lawsuits. The FLSA creates a unique mechanism for a group of
employees to bring a single action, termed a "collective action. 23 In
these collective actions, employees must affirmatively opt in by filing a
form. In a regular federal class action under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, similarly situated employees are class mem-
bers by default and must choose to opt out if they do not wish to be
party to the suit.2 Numerous commentators and courts have noted the
practical effect of the FLSA's collective action rule: the class size is
reduced because fewer people opt in, lowering the available damages
for the class, thus reducing plaintiffs' lawyers' incentive to bring suit."
18 29 USC § 213(a)(1).
19 29 USC § 213(a).
20 See, for example, 29 CFR § 541 (defining the exemptions for executive, administrative,
professional, computer, and outside sales employees).
21 See, for example, Takacs v A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc, 444 F Supp 2d 1100, 1111-13 (SD
Cal 2006) (noting that it is hard to determine if an employee's duties are "administrative");
Harwell and DeCamp, 58 Federation Def & Corp Counsel Q at 271 (cited in note 1) (document-
ing a $135 million settlement to 2,615 misclassified insurance adjusters by State Farm Insurance
Company). For a detailed discussion of the various exemptions that give rise to much wage-and-
hour litigation, see generally Joseph Tilson and Jeremy Glenn, Hot Topics in Wage and Hour
Law, 782 PLI/Lit 827 (2008).
22 29 USC § 216(b).
23 For a discussion of the unique procedural details associated with FLSA collective ac-
tions, see Charles Alan Wright, Arthur B. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 7B Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1807 (West 3d ed 2005).
24 29 USC § 216(b) ("No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he
gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which
such action is brought.").
25 FRCP 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (requiring that potential class members falling under Rule
23(b)(3) be notified of their ability to opt out of the class).
26 See Craig Becker and Paul Strauss, Representing Low-wage Workers in the Absence of a
Class: The Peculiar Case of Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Underenforcement
of Minimum Labor Standards, 92 Minn L Rev 1317, 1318-19 (2008); Ellis v Edward D. Jones &
Co, 527 F Supp 2d 439, 444 (WD Pa 2007) (noting the low opt-in rate of 15 to 30 percent if the
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Also, the Act gives the Secretary of Labor broad powers to intervene
and bring actions on behalf of employees, as well as the power to in-
vestigate potential violations.
Both private plaintiffs and public agencies have roles in enforcing
the statute. The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor
recovered over $185 million in unpaid wages for more than 228,000
employees in fiscal year 2008.2 This is just a small percentage of the
probable number of FLSA violations. 9 Private actions likely recovered
many times more unpaid wages during the same time period. One re-
port suggests private plaintiffs recover over $1 billion annually." The
correct role for public enforcement is also politically contentious. Re-
cently, the Department of Labor was accused of failing to investigate
and pursue workers' claims." Business leaders came to the defense of
the Department of Labor, countering that its goal should be to help
employers comply with the FLSA, not to punish benign mistakes
caused by complex regulations.2 These conflicts demonstrate that the
correct role for public and private enforcement is a political issue.
Additionally, the FLSA contains a savings clause, specifically au-
thorizing states to set stricter regulations: "No provision of this [Act]
shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or munici-
pal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum
collective action is not backed by a union). For a discussion of the economics of class actions, see
generally Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law § 21.11 (Kluwer 7th ed 2007).
27 29 USC § 211 (authorizing the Secretary of Labor to investigate wage-and-hour practic-
es, request data from employers, and enter and inspect workplaces); 29 USC § 216(b) (providing
for the Secretary of Labor to supervise wage-and-hour actions or intervene in court).
28 Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour Division,
Wage and Hour Collects over $1.4 Billion in Back Wages for over 2 Million Employees since
Fiscal Year 2001 1 (Dec 2008), online at http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/statistics/2008FiscalYear.pdf
(visited Sept 1, 2009).
29 See National Employment Law Project, Holding the Wage Floor: Enforcement of Wage
and Hour Standards for Low-wage Workers in an Era of Government Inaction and Employer
Unaccountability 3-7 (Oct 2006), online at
http://nelp.3cdn.net/95b39fc0a12a8d8a34 iwm6bhbv2.pdf (visited Sept 1, 2009) (documenting
labor violations in certain industries, including estimates that over 70 percent of garment em-
ployers in southern California and 100 percent of poultry processing plants are in violation of
wage-and-hour laws).
30 Orey, Wage Wars, Business Week at 50 (cited in note 2).
31 See Michael A. Fletcher, Labor Dept Accused of Straying from Enforcement, Wash Post
A02 (Dec 1, 2008) (detailing accusations by then-Senator Barack Obama that the Department of
Labor was failing to fulfill its enforcement duties and citing a GAO report on the lack of De-
partment of Labor investigations into the treatment of low-wage workers). The Bush administra-
tion took a pro-industry approach of trying to help businesses follow labor regulations, while
various Democrats called for a more pro-worker approach in which the Department of Labor
aggressively enforces the laws. Id.
32 Id (noting the business community's perception that Democratic administrations exer-
cise an "onerous" degree of enforcement, and Republican administrations place more of an
emphasis on assisting companies with compliance).
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wage established under this [Act] or a maximum work week lower
than the maximum workweek established under this chapter."33 The
savings clause explicitly allows states to set higher minimum wages
and adjust the overtime workweek. The overall effect is to give states
a continuing role in regulating wages and hours (subject to federal
minimums). But, the savings clause does not explicitly indicate wheth-
er states may change the remedies available or procedures used to
enforce the FLSA, only that they may adjust the minimum wage and
overtime workweek.
Several years after the passage of the FLSA, Congress enacted
the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947"' in response to pressure from em-
ployers to limit FLSA liabilities." The primary concern was the many
pending "portal-to-portal" suits-actions brought on the theory that
travel time and other preliminary and postliminary work activities
should be compensated. 6 Nearly two thousand such suits had been
filed in a six-month time span, resulting in well over $6 billion (in 1947
dollars) of estimated liability. The Act foreclosed these suits by making
preliminary and postliminary work time generally noncompensable
The Portal-to-Portal Act also made several other substantive
changes to limit employer liability. First, the Act set the statute of limi-
tations at two years (unless the violation was in bad faith, then three
years). 9 And it limited the availability of liquidated damages solely to
bad faith violations.0 Most importantly, the Act amended the FLSA to
require the opt-in collective action described above.4 While the reason
behind this provision is not contained in the conference report or the
House Judiciary Committee Report, the overall structure and intent
of the bill was to lessen employer liability.42 The most apparent conclu-
sion, then, is that this provision was also intended as a check against
the liability faced by employers in large FLSA class actions. Some
support for this can be seen in comments made during the congres-
33 29 USC § 218.
34 Pub L No 80-49,61 Stat 84, codified at 29 USC § 251 et seq.
35 29 USC § 251(a).
36 See Portal-to-Portal Act, HR Rep No 71,80th Cong, 1st Sess 2-3 (1947).
37 Id at 3 (noting that from July 31, 1946 to January 31, 1947, 1,913 suits were filed with
1,515 pleading specific damages amounting to $5.76 billion).
38 29 USC § 252 (foreclosing suits seeking to recover wages for activities that were not
explicitly stated in contract or that were not customarily compensated); 29 USC § 254 (clarifying
that the workday does not include preliminary and postliminary activities).
39 29 USC § 255.
40 29 USC § 260 (stating liquidated damages are not available if the employer satisfies the
court that he has acted in good faith or believed his act or omission did not violate the FLSA).
41 Portal-to-Portal Act, 61 Stat at 87 (specifying the remedies and procedures for notifica-
tion and opt-out).
42 See notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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sional debates. For instance, Senator Forrest C. Donnell, the floor
leader for the bill, stated the purpose was to forbid "representative
actions" where an "outsider ... perhaps someone who is desirous of
stirring up litigation without being an employee at all" would create
"unwholesome champertous situations."3 The Supreme Court has also
endorsed the limitation of employer liability as the purpose of the
Portal-to-Portal Act's collective action provision."
Each of the above changes from the Portal-to-Portal Act limited
employers' FLSA liability. While the original FLSA was predominant-
ly concerned with advancing worker well-being, the Portal-to-Portal
Act supplanted this employee-friendly regime. It provided detailed
enforcement provisions to limit employer liability. Thus, Congress no
longer intended the FLSA to be focused solely on improving em-
ployees' working conditions. Instead, Congress created a balance be-
tween worker well-being and employer liability. This balance is the
basis for the preemption argument: state law claims should be
preempted because otherwise the FLSA's detailed enforcement provi-
sions will be circumvented by state-provided remedies and proce-
dures, thereby disrupting the congressional balance.
B. State Laws
In addition to the FLSA, there are many state law claims that
employees may assert to recover unpaid wages, which often provide
different remedies and procedures. These state laws fall into three cat-
egories: stricter wage-and-hour laws providing greater substantive
rights (meaning greater wages), coextensive wage-and-hour laws pro-
viding the same substantive rights as the FLSA, and remedial laws
providing no substantive rights but that can be used to enforce other
substantive laws, such as state wage-and-hour laws or the FLSA.
43 93 Cong Rec S 2182 (Mar 18, 1947). Senator Donnell had union representatives in mind
when he spoke of "outsiders." Prior to that statement, he used an example of a union representa-
tive five-hundred miles away directing the litigation. Id. Regardless, these worries were most
likely driven by the liability employers would face as a result of any representative action. At the
time, the modern class action did not exist, making the high-damage FLSA collective actions
alarming. See also Becker and Strauss, 92 Minn L Rev at 1321 n 28 (cited in note 26) (noting that
Congress was primarily concerned with litigation caused by unions, but that the restriction im-
posed did not make much sense because courts had already read in an opt-in requirement to
collective actions brought by unions).
44 See Hoffnan-La Roche, Inc v Sperling, 493 US 165, 173 (1989) (noting that the Act was
passed partly in response to "excessive litigation spawned by plaintiffs lacking a personal interest
in the outcome" and aimed to "free[] employers of the burden of representative actions").
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Many states have passed their own substantive wage-and-hour
laws that are stricter than the FLSA. 5 Thirteen states have set a higher
minimum wage rate.6 Others have modified the overtime rules. For
example, Alaska, California, and Nevada require employers to pay
overtime rates for any hours worked in excess of eight in a single day.
7
Still others have laws that extend coverage to employees not covered
48by the FLSA. In all of these instances, the state laws provide em-
ployees with greater substantive wage rights.
In other states, wage-and-hour laws exist, but they are coexten-
sive with the FLSA."' Coextensive state wage-and-hour laws only give
employees the rights to the same wages they would be due under the
FLSA. This often occurs when the state regulations were stricter than
the federal regulations, but Congress subsequently increased wages
making the state and federal rates equal. Even though coextensive
wage-and-hour laws provide employees with the same amount of
wages as the FLSA, employees may prefer these laws if the associated
remedies and procedures are more favorable.
Finally, states may have remedial statutes that enforce state wage-
and-hour laws or the FLSA. These remedial statutes do not create
rights to receive any wages, but are used to enforce wage rights given
by other substantive wage-and-hour laws. The most common remedial
statute is a wage payment law. These laws mandate how wages should
be paid. They do not determine the amount of wages that must be
paid. Instead, they rely on the FLSA or a state wage-and-hour law to
determine the amount of unpaid wages. Iowa's Wage Payment and
Collection Law" (IWPCL) is a model example. This statute requires
employers to have a regular weekly, semimonthly, or monthly payday."
These paydays cannot be more than twelve days (excluding holidays
45 See Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour
Division, Minimum Wage Laws in the States (Jan 1, 2009), online at http://www.dol.gov/
esa/minwage/america.htm (visited Sept 1, 2009).
46 Id.
47 Alaska Stat § 23.10.060 (Michie); Cal Lab Code § 510(a) (West); Nev Rev Stat
§ 608.018(1)(b). Another common change to the overtime rules is that employers must pay
overtime for the sixth and seventh days worked in a single seven-day span. See, for example, KY
Rev Stat Ann § 337.050(1) (Michie).
48 For example, seamen are exempted from the FLSA. See note 19. But California's wage-
and-hour law applies to seamen operating in California's territorial waters. Tidewater Marine
Western, Inc v Bradshaw, 927 P2d 296,296-99 (Cal 1996) (affirming the Division of Labor Stan-
dards Enforcement's decision that seamen are covered by California's wage-and-hour law).
49 See, for example, 19 Del Code Ann § 902 (2008) (setting the state minimum wage at the
federal rate). As of July 24,2009, twenty-seven states had minimum wages equal to the federal rate. See
Minimum Wage Laws in the States, online at httpJ/www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/america.htm (cited in
note 45).
50 Iowa Code Ann § 91A.1 et seq (West).
51 Iowa Code Ann § 91A.3.
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and Sundays) after the period in which the wages were earned.52 The
law is purely remedial and does not provide the amount of wages to
be paid, instead relying on Iowa's wage-and-hour law or the FLSA.
State unfair trade practices laws can also be used as remedial sta-
tutes in wage-and-hour litigation. For example, California courts hold
that the state's Unfair Competition Law5 (UCL) applies to situations
in which employers have not paid their employees the required wages.
The UCL prohibits any "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
practice,"'4 and wage-and-hour law violations qualify as an "unlawful
business act or practice."" Most states' unfair competition laws do not
apply to these situations, however. 6
While not a remedial statute per se, state common law serves a
similar role in wage-and-hour litigation. A statutory wage-and-hour
law violation may serve as the basis of a common law claim. For ex-
ample, plaintiffs in one case claimed their employer acted negligently
by adopting an inaccurate timekeeping system.7 The negligent act was
installing a timekeeping system that resulted in wage-and-hour viola-
tions. To plead the common law claim, the employees had to rely on
the substantive wage-and-hour statute requiring employers to com-
pensate employees for certain work activities. In this manner, the
common law claim is "enforcing" the substantive wage-and-hour law.
The other two frequently used common law claims are fraud and
breach of contract. For example, employees have pleaded fraud when
an employer made representations that the employee was not eligible
for overtime, 8 and they have pleaded breach of contract when there
was an employee handbook explicitly incorporating the FLSA's over-
time requirements.'9 In each of these cases, the common law claims re-
lied on substantive rights created by the state wage-and-hour law or the
FLSA to establish liability. Common law claims may also be used to en-
force employment agreements that set compensation above the federal
wage-and-hour level. These employment-contract disputes are deter-
mined according to contract law and are not the subject of this Comment.
All of these state law claims may provide more favorable reme-
dies and procedures than the FLSA. For example, unfair competition
52 Id.
53 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17200 et seq.
54 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17200.
55 Takacs, 444 F Supp 2d at 1118.
56 See, for example, Anderson v Sara Lee Corp, 508 F3d 181, 190-91 (4th Cir 2007).
57 See text accompanying notes 95-97.
58 Petras v Johnson, 1993 WL 228014, *1-3 (SDNY) (dismissing the employee's common
law claims, which sought punitive damages, because the claims were enforcing the FLSA).
59 Avery v City of Talladega, Alabama, 24 F3d 1337, 1348 (11th Cir 1994) (holding that the
employees' breach of contract claim was not preempted, even though it was enforcing the FLSA).
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laws typically provide treble damages.' State common law claims
usually allow punitive damages.6' Wage payment laws may make liqui-
dated damages mandatory or increase them to twice the amount of
unpaid wages.6, Most importantly, these claims often allow employees
to use an opt-out class action instead of an opt-in collective action.6
Because of the more favorable remedies and procedures, employees
often bring state law claims in addition to, or instead of, FLSA claims.
Employers try to limit their liability exposure by arguing that these
state law claims are preempted.
II. How STATE WAGE-AND-HOUR CLAIMS MAY BE PREEMPTED
This Part describes how the FLSA may preempt state wage-and-
hour claims. It then divides the preemption issue into separate catego-
ries based on the type of state wage-and-hour law and describes how
preemption applies to these specific scenarios. These different scena-
rios will be useful for understanding the case law described in Part III.
They will also be used in Part IV to resolve the preemption dilemma.
Federal law may preempt state law to the extent there is disa-
greement between the two.6 The Supreme Court has recognized three
types of federal preemption: express, field, and conflict.6' Express
preemption applies when a federal statute explicitly abrogates state
law.i Field preemption applies when a state attempts to regulate a
field that Congress intends to regulate exclusively.6' Conflict preemp-
tion applies when it is impossible to comply with both state and feder-
al law, or when state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."''
Federal preemption becomes an issue when employees bring
state law claims instead of, or in addition to, FLSA claims. The general
argument in favor of preemption is that Congress intended the
FLSA's specific procedures and remedies to apply to all wage claims
as a way of limiting employer liability. State wage claims that provide
60 See Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17082.
61 See, for example, Petras, 1993 WL 228014 at *1 (seeking punitive damages by claiming
common law fraud in a wage-and-hour dispute).
62 See, for example, 26 Me Rev Stat Ann § 626-A (West) (mandating employers pay twice
the unpaid wages as liquidated damages for violations of Maine's state wage payment law).
63 See, for example, Bouaphakeo v Tyson Foods, Inc, 564 F Supp 2d 870, 909 (ND Iowa
2008) (allowing the plaintiffs to proceed with their IWPCL claim as a Rule 23 class action).
64 US Const Art VI, cl 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land ... Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
65 English v General Electric Co, 496 US 72,78-79 (1990).
66 Id at 78.
67 Id at 79.
68 Id.
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different procedures and remedies stand as an obstacle to that con-
gressional objective, implicating conflict preemption. Express preemp-
tion does not apply because the FLSA does not explicitly address
whether states may provide different remedies and procedures. 9 It
only prevents states from setting lower wage-and-hour standards.
Field preemption does not apply because the FLSA gives states a con-
tinuing role in regulating wages through the savings clause."
As described in Part I, state wage-and-hour laws may differ from
the FLSA in several ways, and these differences will lead to different
preemption arguments. First, the state wage-and-hour law may pro-
vide greater substantive rights for some employees, such as a greater
minimum wage, or by extending coverage to employees not covered
by the FLSA. Second, the state wage-and-hour law may be coexten-
sive with the FLSA so that the amount of unpaid wages due under
both is the same. Third, and finally, there may simply be no state wage-
and-hour law. Even without a state wage-and-hour law, other state law
claims may still be used to enforce the FLSA. All of these three situa-
tions bring about different preemption scenarios.
Note that a single state law may fit into several preemption cate-
gories depending on the nature of the case. For example, a state wage-
and-hour law may exclude any FLSA-covered employee.7 When
FLSA-covered employees bring suit, the state wage-and-hour law
does not apply to them, making the case fit into the third category. But
for non-FLSA-covered employees, the state wage-and-hour law is
their only source of substantive wage rights. In this case, the claim fits
in the first category.
A. The State Wage-and-Hour Law Provides Greater Substantive
Rights
The first scenario-in which the state wage-and-hour law pro-
vides greater substantive rights than the FLSA-presents the weakest
argument for preemption. Here, the employee is due a higher amount
of wages under the state law than the FLSA. The only way he can re-
cover the full amount of his unpaid wages is through state law.2
69 See 29 USC § 218. See also Williamson v General Dynamics Corp, 208 F3d 1144, 1151
(9th Cir 2000) (addressing FLSA preemption of state law claims and noting "[n]o statutory
language expressly preempts the [employees'] claims").
70 See 29 USC § 218. See also Williamson, 208 F3d at 1151 ("FLSA's 'savings clause' is
evidence that Congress did not intend to preempt the entire field.").
71 See, for example, 40 Okla Stat Ann § 197.4(d) (West) ("This act shall not apply to em-
ployers subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.").
72 Note that it is plausible that employees may choose to bring a FLSA claim instead of a
state law claim, even though the employee will receive a greater amount of wages under state
law. Employees would do this if the FLSA provided more favorable remedies and procedures,
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Preempting the entire claim is not an option because that would be
plainly contrary to the FLSA's savings clause, which specifically allows
states to set stricter minimum wage rates and overtime provisions. The
only possible argument is that states may enact stricter wage provi-
sions but may not enact separate enforcement provisions.
Every court that has addressed this scenario directly has held that
state enforcement provisions are not preempted.73 Courts have impli-
citly assumed that the congressional authorization to set higher wage
rates is also an authorization for states to set distinct enforcement me-
chanisms for those higher rates. This view has textual support from the
FLSA, which states that the FLSA's enforcement procedures only ap-
ply to FLSA violations." Therefore the FLSA's enforcement provisions
would not apply to situations in which only the state wage-and-hour law
is violated. This is precisely the situation here. States have stricter wage-
and-hour laws so that employers may be in violation of state law, but
not in violation of the FLSA; and therefore, FLSA's enforcement provi-
sions do not apply because there has been no FLSA violation.
B. The State Wage-and-Hour Law Is Coextensive with the FLSA
The argument for preemption is stronger when the state wage-
and-hour law is coextensive with the FLSA. The state is effectively
substituting its remedies for those provided by the FLSA. Unlike the
previous category, every violation of a state wage-and-hour law is also
a violation of the FLSA. In every case, the employee may recover the
entirety of his wages through the FLSA's enforcement provisions. The
employee has just chosen to use the state enforcement provisions in-
stead. The argument for preemption, then, is that the state is frustrat-
ing congressional intent by changing the remedies associated with
FLSA violations when it does not have the explicit authority to do so.
On the other hand, the state has enacted its own wage-and-hour
law providing employees with independent substantive rights. While
Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act to limit employer liability, it
is possible that Congress only intended to limit employer liability im-
and if the benefit from those remedies and procedures outweighed the extra wages due under
state law. But, no situation was found in which this was the case because the FLSA remedies and
procedures appear to always be less favorable than those provided by state laws. This does not
affect the analysis of this Comment because the state law claim would not be preempted; the
employee would just choose not to use it.
73 See, for example, Pacific Merchant Shipping Association v Aubry, 918 F2d 1409, 1420
(9th Cir 1990) (upholding a California law extending overtime to seamen, which are exempted
from the FLSA).
74 See 29 USC § 216(b) (providing remedies and procedures for any employer who "vi-
olates the provisions" of the FLSA).
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posed by federal law.5 Arguably then, a state retains the authority to
set distinct remedies for violations of its state wage-and-hour law. In
doing so, the state is not replacing the FLSA's enforcement provisions,
but is exercising its continuing ability to regulate wages and hours sub-
ject to federal minimum standards.
This is also likely to be the preemption scenario under which
most wage-and-hour disputes arise. It often occurs when a state passes
a minimum wage law higher than the federal rate with a provision that
the state's minimum wage will increase to the federal rate, if the fed-
eral rate ever becomes higher.76 The federal minimum wage is then
increased, causing the state wage-and-hour law to be the same as the
FLSA. The recent minimum wage increase (completed July 24, 2009)
caused twenty-seven states to have minimum wages equal to the fed-
eral rate and twenty-four states to have identical overtime provisions.7
Furthermore, a large majority (approximately 90 percent) of the
wage-and-hour cases are overtime violations. Since twenty-four
states have coextensive overtime provisions and a majority of wage-
and-hour claims deal with overtime violations, a substantial portion of
FLSA preemption disputes fall into this category.
C. The State Wage-and-Hour Law Does Not Exist or Does Not Apply
The third scenario-in which the state wage-and-hour law does
not exist or does not apply-presents the strongest argument for
preemption. The state does not have a substantive wage-and-hour law,
so any state law claim is merely enforcing the FLSA. These state law
claims provide different remedies than the FLSA, but rely on the
FLSA for the substantive rights being asserted, making the state
claims purely remedial. The preemption argument is that these state
law claims are frustrating congressional intent by providing new re-
medies in place of the FLSA's specific remedies. Unlike the second
75 See Part L.A (describing the shift in congressional intent from sole concern with em-
ployee well-being with the FLSA of 1938 to a balance between employee well-being and em-
ployer liability with the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947).
76 See text accompanying note 49.
77 See Department of Labor, Minimum Wage Laws in the States (cited in note 45). Many
more states have overtime provisions that are substantially similar to the FLSA. They have
minor differences like requiring overtime pay for the seventh consecutive day worked. Id. These
differences are usually not an issue raised in wage-and-hour suits, so that the state overtime
provisions are coextensive with federal law in most cases, notwithstanding the minor differences.
But, these states with minor differences were excluded from the tally. The number of states with
overtime provisions effectively coextensive with the FLSA may be significantly higher.
78 US Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Collects over $1.4 Billion at 2 (cited in
note 28) (reporting that, of the total unpaid wages collected by the Department of Labor,
88 percent were from overtime violations and 12 percent were from minimum wage violations).
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scenario, there is no argument that state law provides remedies for an
independent state wage-and-hour violation.
III. THE CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO FLSA PREEMPTION
This Part lays out the conflicting case law on whether the FLSA
preempts certain state law claims. First, it describes one of the earliest
decisions on the issue by the Ninth Circuit. Ultimately, the Ninth Cir-
cuit decided the case on other grounds, but the opinion provides a
detailed preemption analysis and has been cited by several courts.
Then, it presents the conflicting district and circuit court cases, making
use of the framework from Part II.
A. The Ninth Circuit's Preemption Analysis
In Williamson v General Dynamics Corp,79 four General Dynam-
ics employees sued to recover unpaid overtime wages. They were
originally eligible to join a settlement class action to receive their un-
paid wages.8' But, their employer advised them not to join the settle-
ment class action because it would be "career suicide."'" General Dy-
namics promised them that their jobs would be safe if they did not
join the settlement suit.3 As a result, the employees chose not to join
the lawsuit, but lost their jobs less than a year later when General Dy-
namics closed their division for business reasons." Subsequently, the
four employees brought common law fraud claims based on General
Dynamics's inducement not to join the settlement class action in re-
turn for job security."
General Dynamics argued that the employees' fraud claim was
equivalent to a claimed violation of the FLSA's antiretaliation provi-
sion, which protects employees from retaliation for asserting their
FLSA wage rights." In General Dynamics's view, the common law
claim provided nothing more than a remedy for a FLSA violation. If
that were the case, the claim would fall into the third preemption cat-
egory (nonexistent state wage-and-hour law) because it would have
been enforcing the FLSA. Congressional intent would arguably be
frustrated because state law remedies would replace the FLSA's en-
forcement provisions. The court ultimately held that the fraud claims
79 208 F3d 1144 (9th Cir 2000).
80 Idat 1148.
81 Id at 1147.
82 Id.
83 Williamson, 208 F3d at 1147.
84 Id at 1148.
85 Id at 1147.
86 Id at 1152.
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were not equivalent to claims of violations of the FLSA's antiretalia-
tion provisions." The fraud claim remedied a wrong that the FLSA did
not cover and was therefore outside the FLSA's preemptive scope."
Before coming to that conclusion, the court gave a detailed
preemption analysis, focusing on the congressional intent behind the
FLSA. It brushed aside the employer's argument that the Portal-to-
Portal amendments to the FLSA were intended to "mitigate the im-
pact of the [original FLSA] on American industry by [limiting re-
lief]."9' Instead, the court stated that "the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit have consistently found that the central purpose of the
FLSA is to enact minimum wage and maximum hour provisions de-
signed to protect employees."9' To the Ninth Circuit, the primary focus
of Congress was to maximize employee welfare, not balance employee
and employer interests.
Even so, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[c]laims ... directly cov-
ered by the FLSA ... must be brought under the FLSA."9' This state-
ment was dicta, but clearly suggested state law claims are preempted
in situations where the FLSA could be used to recover the unpaid
wages. That would mean claims falling in the second preemption cate-
gory (coextensive state wage-and-hour law) and third preemption
category (nonexistent state wage-and-hour law) would be preempted.
Subsequent courts in and outside the Ninth Circuit have interpreted
this decision differently.
B. Courts Preempting State Law Claims
The Fourth Circuit-the most recent circuit court to address the
issue-has held that common law claims cannot be used to enforce the
FLSA. In Anderson v Sara Lee Corp,93 more than one thousand work-
ers at a Sara Lee factory filed a class action to recover unpaid wages.-
They pleaded various common law causes of action and, notably, did
not plead a FLSA violation. 5 Instead of claiming a FLSA violation
because they were not compensated for time worked, they pleaded
87 Williamson, 208 F3d at 1152 (holding the FLSA's antiretaliation provision would not apply
because the employees did not file a wage complaint, complain to supervisors, or cause any pro-
ceedings to be instituted).
88 Id at 1154 ("Fraud claims by employees do not conflict with the FLSA any more than
claims for wrongful death, assault, or murder.").
89 Idat 1150.
90 Idat 1154.
91 Williamson, 208 F3d at 1154.
92 Id.
93 508 F3d 181 (4th Cir 2007).
94 Id at 182.
95 Id (alleging breach of contract, negligence, fraud, conversion, and unfair trade practices).
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common law negligence due to an inaccurate timekeeping system. The
plaintiffs did not assert that any state statute entitled them to the un-
paid wages." As such, the court noted these state law claims were
simply enforcing the FLSA.q Under this Comment's framework, the
state law claims would fall in the third preemption category (enforcing
the FLSA).
The court held that the common law claims must be preempted
because they frustrated congressional intent (conflict preemption)."
Congress had provided an "unusually elaborate enforcement scheme"
to remedy FLSA violations." In addition, the FLSA savings clause did
not authorize states to set alternative remedies for FLSA violations."O
The court inferred from this that Congress intended the FLSA to be
the exclusive remedy for violations of its provisions, meaning that
common law claims could not be used to enforce the FLSA.' °'
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Anderson-that the FLSA pro-
vides the exclusive remedy for violations of its provisions-has al-
ready been followed by a number of district courts. For example, in
Lopez v Flight Services & Systems, Inc, ' the court dismissed several
common law causes of action because they were all remedial: "[A]II of
the state-law claims pertain to Defendants' alleged failure to pay
Plaintiffs in accordance with the FLSA.'. 3 The court relied on the
Fourth Circuit's holding that state law claims providing remedies for
FLSA violations are preempted.?°
But unlike the Fourth Circuit, which noted that no state law en-
titled the plaintiffs to wages, Lopez dismissed the common law claims
even though the employees pleaded state wage-and-hour law viola-
tions."' Arguably, this makes Lopez distinguishable from the Fourth
Circuit's Anderson holding because the common law claims could
have been enforcing the state wage-and-hour law and not just enforc-
ing the FLSA. The Lopez court did not mention this distinction. Also,
note that under this Comment's framework, Lopez falls in the second
category (enforcing a state wage-and-hour law) while Anderson falls
in the third category.
96 Idat 193.
97 Anderson, 508 F3d at 193-94.
98 Id.
99 Id at 192.
100 Id at 193.
101 Anderson, 508 F3d at 194.
102 2008 WL 203028 (WDNY).
103 Id at *7.
104 Id at *5.
105 Id at *1.
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In Roman v Maietta Construction, Inc0°-a First Circuit decision
similar to Lopez-the plaintiff claimed state wage-and-hour and
FLSA violations" He recovered his unpaid wages at trial, but ap-
pealed because a state wage payment law would have provided him
with twice the amount of liquidated damages than he received."' The
court held that this claim was preempted because state law claims
cannot be used to replace the FLSA's enforcement provisions."9 Like
in Lopez, there was also a state wage-and-hour law, which provided
substantive rights at least equal to those of the FLSA."' Again, the
court did not distinguish between situations in which a state wage-
and-hour law exists and those in which no such law exists.
While most courts that have preempted state law claims have
done so because of the FLSA's detailed enforcement provisions, the
Central District of California took a slightly different approach by
focusing on the balance between enhancing employee well-being and
limiting employer liability. In Flores v Albertson's Inc,"' the plaintiffs
pleaded FLSA and California wage-and-hour law violations, as well as
common law negligence and Unfair Competition Law claims."2 Rely-
ing on Ninth Circuit precedent from Williamson, the court held that
the common law negligence claims were preempted because they
were "directly covered" by the FLSA."3 They were nothing more than
"additional legal theories.""4 Allowing the common law claims would
have "upset the balance established by Congress in enacting the
106 147 F3d 71 (1st Cir 1998).
107 Id at 72-73.
108 Id at 76 ("[The employee] argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant him reme-
dies set forth in [Maine's wage payment law].").
109 Id ("[Tlhe plaintiff cannot circumvent the exclusive remedy prescribed by Congress by
asserting equivalent state claims in addition to the FLSA claim."). The court also provided an
alternative procedural reason for its holding. The court noted that the plaintiff had not specifical-
ly pleaded a state wage payment violation, only a violation of the state minimum wage law. Id.
Thus, the plaintiff had waived his right to assert the state wage payment claim. Even if the case
was decided on a procedural issue, other courts have ignored the procedural justification and
have interpreted the case to mean that state claims enforcing the FLSA are preempted. See, for
example, Bouaphakeo v Tyson Foods, Inc, 564 F Supp 2d 870,884 (ND Iowa 2008) (citing Roman
for the proposition that the FLSA is the exclusive remedy for enforcing rights under the FLSA);
Anderson, 508 F3d at 194 (listing Roman as one of a series of cases in agreement with its holding
that the FLSA provides exclusive remedies for violations of its provisions).
110 See 26 Me Rev Stat Ann § 664 (West) (requiring that the state minimum wage be at
least equal to the federal minimum wage and requiring overtime pay for hours worked in excess
of forty in a single week).
111 2003 WL 24216269 (CD Cal).
112 Id at *1.
113 Id at *6.
114 Id at *5.
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[FLSA]."'' . Like in previous cases, a state wage-and-hour law existed,
but the court did not reference that in its analysis. In the court's view, the
common law negligence claims were just enforcing the FLSA and would
have upset the congressional balance by increasing employer liability. 6
C. Courts Allowing State Law Claims
While Flores interpreted the Ninth Circuit's "directly covered"
language to mean that state law claims enforcing the FLSA are
preempted, other district courts within the Ninth Circuit have come to
the opposite conclusion, finding that such claims are not preempted."'
In Takacs v A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc,"8 a group of financial consul-
tants sued for overtime pay, claiming FLSA violations, California
wage-and-hour law violations, and UCL violations."9 Both Flores and
Takacs were litigated in California with the same state law background,
making the cases indistinguishable. In both cases, there was a state
wage-and-hour law at least as strict as the FLSA,'2° placing them in the
first or second preemption category.2 The defendants argued that Wil-
liamson required the court to hold that the UCL claim was preempted
because it was "directly covered" by the FLSA.'22 The court rejected this
115 Flores, 2003 WL 24216269 at *5. Surprisingly, the court did allow the UCL claim to re-
main without any justification. Id at *6. It is not clear why the court believed the common law
claims would upset the balance, but the UCL claim would not.
116 The increase in liability is due to the more favorable remedies and procedures, not be-
cause plaintiffs are allowed double recovery under state and federal law. No court has ever al-
lowed plaintiffs this type of double recovery. See, for example, Roman, 147 F3d at 76 ("Since [the
plaintiff] received compensation under the FLSA for his claims, he cannot recover again under
[state] law.").
117 See Bahramipour v Citigroup Global Markets, Inc, 2006 WL 449132, *2-6 (ND Cal)
(holding that an opt-out UCL class action was not preempted by the FLSA); Barnett v Washing-
ton Mutual Bank, FA, 2004 WL 2011462, *4-7 (ND Cal) (same). See also Tomlinson v Indymac
Bank, FSB, 359 F Supp 2d 898, 899-902 (CD Cal 2005) (rejecting a preemption-like argument
that the UCL should not be construed to allow plaintiffs to plead around the FLSA's specific
provisions).
118 444 F Supp 2d 1100 (SD Cal 2006).
119 Id at 1104.
120 Compare California Department of Industrial Relations, History of California Minimum
Wage, online at http://www.dir.ca.gov/Iwc/MinimumWageHistory.htm (visited Sept 1, 2009)
(documenting the minimum wage as $6.75 between January 1, 2002 and January 1, 2007), with
Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, History of Federal Minimum Wage Rates under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938-2007, online at http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/chart.pdf (visited
Sept 1, 2009) (documenting the minimum wage as $5.15 between September 1,1997 and July 24,2007).
See also text accompanying note 47 (noting California's stricter overtime provisions).
121 Even though the state wage-and-hour law has stricter rates than the FLSA, the damages
due under both laws may have been the same. This occurs when the overtime provisions are
violated and the unpaid overtime is the same under state and federal law. With the available
facts, it is not clear whether the claim fits in the first or second category.
122 Takacs, 444 F Supp 2d at 1117.
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argument, stating that Williamson was nonbinding dicta.' It empha-
sized the Williamson court's conclusion that the primary purpose of the
FLSA was to "protect all covered workers from substandard wages and
oppressive hours."24 Thus, the court found no conflict with the FLSA
because the UCL claim would impose greater liability, and as a result,
"protect against a greater number of violations of the federal law."' The
court did not consider whether this would upset a congressional balance
between employee working conditions and employer liability like the
Flores court did when it came to the opposite conclusion."'
The Northern District of Iowa went one step further by holding
that state law claims are not preempted even when they are enforcing
the FLSA and cannot be enforcing a state wage-and-hour law. In
Bouaphakeo v Tyson Foods, Inc,' a group of approximately 1,600 em-
ployees working at a Tyson pork processing facility sued to recover for
uncompensated work hours."' The employees claimed that Tyson vi-
olated the FLSA and the IWPCL.12 The IWPCL is a purely remedial
statute3' for wage-and-hour violations that the plaintiffs likely used
because it allowed them to file an opt-out class action.3' Because the
plaintiffs did not assert any state wage-and-hour violation, the IWPCL
claim relied on the FLSA to determine the amount of wages due.1
2
Thus, the IWPCL claim was solely enforcing the FLSA, placing the
case in the third preemption category.
In its analysis, the Bouaphakeo court noted how similar this situa-
tion was to the one the Fourth Circuit faced in Anderson-a state law
claim was enforcing the FLSA. Instead of following the Fourth Cir-
cuit, the court used the Ninth Circuit's Williamson decision as guid-
ance.' The court stated that the primary purpose of the FLSA was to
promote employee welfare, as had the Ninth Circuit.'- Consequently,
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id at 1117 n 12.
126 See text accompanying notes 113-115.
127 564 F Supp 2d 870 (ND Iowa 2008).
128 Id at 878.
129 Iowa Code § 91A.1 et seq.
130 Hornby v State, 559 NW2d 23, 26 (Iowa 1997) (stating that "chapter 91A is a remedial
statute" designed to help "employees collect wages owed to them by their employers").
131 Bouaphakeo, 564 F Supp 2d at 880 ("Plaintiffs also ask the court to certify their
[IWPCL] claim as a 'class action' under Rule 23 of the [FRCP].").
132 Id at 883 ("Plaintiffs do not assert their right to wages ... is conferred by anything other
than the FLSA."); id at 886 ("[T]his case may be a first in holding that the FLSA does not
preempt a duplicative state law claim.").
133 See id at 881. Interestingly enough, the court viewed Anderson and Williamson as con-
flicting decisions, which is not strictly correct. Williamson did not concretely hold whether the
FLSA preempted state law claims enforcing the FLSA as Anderson did. See Part III.A.
134 Id at 885.
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the court perceived no conflict in allowing a state law claim which
would further the Act's purpose by providing greater remedies, deter-
ring future violations.
The Eastern District of North Carolina took the middle ground
by specifically allowing state law claims to enforce only substantive
state wage-and-hour laws. In Martinez-Hernandez v Butterball, LLC,'35
the employees pleaded violations of North Carolina's wage payment
law, North Carolina's wage-and-hour law, and the FLSA.' 6 Important-
ly, the plaintiffs specifically pleaded that their state wage payment
claim relied on North Carolina's wage-and-hour law to determine the
amount of wages due, and not on the FLSA.'37 The court used this to
distinguish the Fourth Circuit's holding in Anderson that state law
claims enforcing the FLSA are preempted.3" Without further discus-
sion, the court held that the state wage payment claim was not
preempted. "9 Unlike previous courts, Martinez-Hernandez found that
state law claims enforcing state wage-and-hour laws and state law
claims enforcing the FLSA are distinguishable. This approach amounts
to holding that claims falling in the second preemption category (coex-
tensive state wage-and-hour law) are not preempted, while claims fall-
ing in the third category (no state wage-and-hour law) are preempted.
The Eleventh Circuit is the only circuit court to address the issue
and hold that state law claims are not preempted.' In Avery v City of
Talladega, Alabama,'' police department employees brought FLSA
and breach of contract claims to recover overtime pay. ' The breach of
contract claim sought to enforce an employment contract, which the
court interpreted as providing the same rights as the FLSA: "[T]he
parties' intent ... was to be bound by the terms of the FLSA, nothing
more."'43 It is not clear whether the court meant that the breach of
contract claim was enforcing the FLSA or that the contract was a sep-
arate legally binding agreement that imported the FLSA's terms. If the
court meant it was the former, then this case would fit into the third
135 578 F Supp 2d 816 (EDNC 2008).
136 Id at 817.
137 Id at 820.
138 Id at 819.
139 Martinez-Hernandez, 578 F Supp 2d at 820.
140 The opinion is relatively old (issued in 1994) and the preemption analysis is cursory
(only several paragraphs). See Avery v City of Talladega, Alabama, 24 F3d 1337, 1348 (11th Cir
1994). Thus, the opinion is on relatively shaky ground and perhaps the Eleventh Circuit would
decide the case differently today. It is included for completeness and because several other deci-
sions cite to it for the stated proposition. See, for example, Anderson, 508 F3d at 194-95 (citing
Avery for the proposition that common law claims may be used to enforce the FLSA).
141 24 F3d 1337 (11th Cir 1994).
142 Id at 1340.
143 Id at 1348.
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preemption category because a state law claim would be enforcing the
FLSA. If it is the latter, then there is no preemption issue because the
parties agreed to an independently enforceable contract. At least one
court has interpreted this case to stand for the former proposition-
state law claims may be used to enforce the FLSA."
While the case law is complex, several principles emerge. Courts
finding preemption of state law claims usually focus on the FLSA's
detailed enforcement provisions as evidence that Congress intended
for no other remedies or procedures to be available to employees in
FLSA suits. In doing so, several of those courts have, perhaps uninten-
tionally, overlooked the fact that the state law claims may be enforcing
state wage-and-hour laws. In addition, at least one court has held that
state law claims are preempted because they would impose additional
liability on employers, upsetting the congressional balance. On the
other hand, courts that hold state law claims are not preempted usual-
ly focus on the FLSA's original purpose. The FLSA intended to reme-
dy poor working conditions. State law claims with more favorable re-
medies or procedures will deter FLSA violations and are therefore in
accord with that purpose.
IV. RESOLVING THE PREEMPTION DILEMMA
The preemption dilemma must be solved by determining whether
Congress intended to preempt state law, as congressional intent is the
"ultimate touchstone" in every preemption case. ' This Part applies
the traditional methods of determining congressional intent in
preemption cases to show that the issue cannot be conclusively re-
solved by those methods. "6 Each of the three indicators of congres-
sional intent-plain text, structure, and purpose-leave some doubt as
to whether state law claims should be preempted when there is a
coextensive state wage-and-hour law. This Part then argues for a
strong presumption against preemption because states have had a tra-
ditional (and continuing) role in wage-and-hour regulation and en-
forcement. It revives the often-repeated-but often-ignored-
preemption doctrine that Congress should not be presumed to inter-
144 See Anderson, 508 F3d at 195.
145 Altria Group, Inc v Good, 129 S Ct 538,543 (2008).
146 This is not uncommon. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and
Policies 377 (Aspen 2d ed 2002) (noting that often the "Court purports to be finding congres-
sional intent" but that it is often "left to make guesses" because the intent is not clear).
20091
1272 The University of Chicago Law Review [76:1251
fere with traditional areas of state regulation." Next, this Part applies
this presumption, along with the traditional indicators of congression-
al intent, to the three preemption categories discussed in Part II and
finds that state law claims should only be preempted when the state
does not have a wage-and-hour law (the third preemption category).
Finally, this Part applies this analysis to the previous case law to show
the practical results of the proposed solution.
A. The Traditional Preemption Analysis Yields Ambiguous Results
Courts resolve preemption cases by determining whether Con-
gress intended to preempt state laws."8 To determine congressional
intent, the Court routinely uses three indicators: (1) the plain text,
(2) the statute's structure, and (3) the statute's purpose.' 9 Each of
these indicators of congressional intent is ambiguous when there is a
coextensive state wage-and-hour law, which is likely to be the most
common situation faced by courts.'" Thus, congressional intent cannot
decisively resolve the preemption issue.
First, the plain text of the statute only addresses state laws in the
savings clause: "No provision of this chapter ... shall excuse noncom-
pliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance estab-
lishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established
under this chapter or a maximum work week lower than the maxi-
mum work week.'"' The plainest interpretation of this language is that
Congress intended to allow states to set higher minimum wages and
stricter overtime rules. The text does not address remedies, and there-
fore congressional intent to preempt state law claims should not be
inferred from the text. "
One commentator has argued that a negative inference should be
drawn from the savings clause. This argument suggests that since Con-
gress explicitly chose not to preempt stricter state wage-and-hour
laws, it should be inferred that Congress intended to preempt state law
147 See Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 US 218, 230 (1947) ("[Wle start with the assump-
tion that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of the Congress.").
148 Altria, 129 S Ct at 543 ("[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every
pre-emption case").
149 Id; Medtronic, Inc v Lohr, 518 US 470,485-86 (1996). See also James T. O'Reilly, Federal
Preemption of State and Local Law: Legislation, Regulation and Litigation 79 (ABA 2006) (not-
ing that courts begin their consideration of preemption issues by examining the statutory text
and then turning to an inquiry into the statute's structure and purpose).
150 See text accompanying notes 76-78.
151 29 USC § 218(a).
152 See Williamson, 208 F3d at 1151 ("While the FLSA may be a comprehensive remedy,...
the 'savings clause' indicates that it does not provide an exclusive remedy.").
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claims in the absence of a stricter state wage-and-hour law."' If this were
the case, then a coextensive wage-and-hour law would be preempted
along with the more favorable remedies and procedures it supplied.
The application of this inference is questionable in light of the
plainer interpretation that Congress just intended states to be able to
set higher minimum wages and did not consider preempting coexten-
sive wage-and-hour laws. Courts have noted the clear language of the
savings clause and stated that it should be interpreted "narrowly" as
"merely establish[ing] a wage and hour 'floor' above which states are
free to rise."' In other contexts, similar negative inference arguments
have been rejected as inconclusive canons of statutory interpreta-
tion. ' Congress could have preempted state law remedies with a more
precise statement,"' but did not do so, casting doubt on whether a
more strained interpretation should be used.' 7
Second, some courts interpret the structure of the statute to show
that Congress intended to preempt state law remedies. '" Congress
supplied detailed enforcement provisions to remedy FLSA violations.
This is evidence that Congress intended that only those provisions
may be used to enforce the Act. Thus, when an employee is able to
recover his unpaid wages through the FLSA, congressional intent will
be frustrated if the employee is instead allowed to use a state law
claim. These state law claims provide their own remedies and proce-
dures, which effectively replace the detailed enforcement provisions
that Congress intended to be available."
153 Rachel K. Alexander, Federal Tails and State Puppy Dogs: Preempting Parallel State
Wage Claims to Preserve The Integrity of Federal Group Wage Actions, 58 Am U L Rev 515,552
(2009) ("[T]he existence of the FLSA's savings clause demonstrates Congress's intent ... to
preempt state law claims that were equal to or less generous than FLSA's terms.").
154 See, for example, Ellis v Edward D. Jones & Co, 527 F Supp 2d 439,450 (WD Pa 2007).
155 See, for example, United States v Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F3d 1294, 1299 (10th Cir 1999)
(holding that a federal statute authorizing state and local police to arrest immigrants in some
circumstances did not mean Congress intended to displace state and local police authority to
arrest immigrants in other circumstances).
156 ERISA is one example where Congress was explicit in its intent to preempt state law
remedies. See 29 USC § 1144(a) ("[ERISA] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."); Barber v Unum Life Insurance Co
of America, 383 F3d 134, 140-41 (3d Cir 2004) (holding that a Pennsylvania statute providing
punitive damages for ERISA violations was preempted because of the express preemption
clause in § 1144(a)). But see Equal Pay Act, 42 USC § 2000e-7 (allowing states to set their own
penalties for employment discrimination, thus suggesting that perhaps Congress is explicit when
it wishes to allow states to set their own remedies and not the other way around).
157 It is not uncommon that the plain text does not resolve preemption issues. See O'Reilly,
Federal Preemption at 55, 58 (cited in note 149) (noting that federal preemption is usually a
"minor detail" and that it may be intentionally left undecided to aid the speedy passage of a bill).
158 See, for example, Anderson, 508 F3d at 194.
159 See id.
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Even if this argument is somewhat persuasive, it does not resolve
the issue. In the coextensive situation, there is a separate coextensive
state wage-and-hour law, which gives employees the right to receive
the same amount of wages as the FLSA does. It is plausible that state
law claims are not enforcing the FLSA, but are instead enforcing the
state wage-and-hour law, and thus, the state enforcement provisions
are not replacing the FLSA's enforcement provisions. The FLSA's de-
tailed enforcement provisions will still apply to claims that are actual-
ly enforcing the FLSA. This understanding has some support from the
FLSA's text, which only says that the enforcement provisions apply to
violations of the FLSA." Since it is unclear whether the detailed en-
forcement provisions should be extended to apply to state wage-and-
hour law violations, the structure of the Act does not conclusively re-
solve the issue either."'
Third, the FLSA's purpose does not resolve the preemption issue.
Congress intended the original FLSA to benefit workers. '62 More fa-
vorable state law remedies would not contradict this purpose because
they would deter noncompliance with the FLSA.'3 But, the Portal-to-
Portal Act intended to limit employer liability. This amendment ba-
lanced employees' ability to enforce the FLSA with the costs imposed
on employers.' To the extent that the Portal-to-Portal Act conflicts
with the FLSA's original purpose, the Portal-to-Portal Act must be
given primacy in determining congressional intent because it is the
most recent legislative action. ' Thus, it is incorrect to assert that the
FLSA only intends to benefit workers by increasing individual wages,
as some courts have done."
Even so, it is not clear whether this balance should extend to state
wage-and-hour laws. The Portal-to-Portal Act may have only intended
to limit liability imposed by the FLSA, and not liability imposed by
160 See 29 USC § 216(b) (stating that the enforcement provisions only apply to violations of
§ 206 (minimum wage) and § 207 (overtime)).
161 Ocean-fishing regulations are an example of federal laws with sufficient structural detail
to suggest congressional intent to preempt state law. The level of detail suggests a "regulatory
system that Congress intends to be national in character." O'Reilly, Federal Preemption at 71
(cited in note 149), citing City of Charleston, South Carolina v A Fisherman's Best, Inc, 310 F3d
155, 170 (4th Cir 2002). That does not exist here because wage-and-hour regulation is not exclu-
sively national, and thus, it is not clear that the detailed enforcement scheme should be extended
to state wage-and-hour laws.
162 See text accompanying notes 89-91.
163 See text accompanying notes 124-125.
164 See text accompanying note 115.
165 See 82 CJS Statutes § 243 (2005) (stating that amendments have a "force superior" to
the original legislative enactment in the case of conflict between the two).
166 See text accompanying notes 118-126 (discussing the Takacs case where the court stated
that the purpose of the FLSA was solely to protect workers from oppressive working conditions,
and therefore more favorable remedies should be allowed to deter violations).
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state laws. After all, the FLSA explicitly allows states to set stricter
wage-and-hour laws, and this was not changed by the Portal-to-Portal
Act. ' These state laws increase employer liability, also upsetting the con-
gressional balance. Since states may already upset this "balance" by
enacting stricter wage-and-hour laws, it is not clear why states may not
upset this "balance" in other ways, like setting their own enforcement
provisions. Furthermore, it appears questionable to extend the Portal-to-
Portal Act to preempt state law remedies when the main impetus behind
the Act was to abolish "portal-to-portal" suits, not to limit remedies.""
B. A Presumption against Preemption: States Traditionally Regulate
Wages and Hours
The Supreme Court has long held that there should be a pre-
sumption against preemption in areas of traditional state authority. '
The justification for this presumption finds its roots in federalism
principles."" If courts are too quick to preempt state laws in areas that
states have traditionally regulated, then the benefits of our federalist
system will be diminished because states will lose much of their au-
tonomy. Courts should only preempt state law in these areas when
Congress has been clear about its intent by providing a plain state-
ment'" But, this presumption is often not decisive in courts' decisions,'72
and some commentators argue that it has been effectively abandoned. "'
The courts "pay lip service" to the presumption and then ignore it. '
167 See 29 USC § 218(a).
168 See text accompanying notes 35-38. Federal regulation of automobile safety features is
an example of when purpose carries the day. In Geier v American Honda Motor Co, state tort
suits seeking damages for unsafe automobiles were preempted because the federal regulations
intended to create a regulatory environment where manufacturers were free to experiment with
safety devices. 529 US 861, 874-75 (2000). State tort suits would have imposed additional safety
requirements on manufacturers and frustrated the regulations' purpose. Id at 881. The requisite
purpose is lacking here because Congress did intend for states to be able to impose additional
costs on employers (at least through stricter wage-and-hour laws).
169 See Rice, 331 US at 230; Altria, 129 S Ct at 543 (citing Rice for the presumption against
preemption in a 2008 case).
170 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law at 379 (cited in note 146).
171 See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 480 (Foundation 2d ed 1988) (noting
that the Supreme Court only finds preemption when Congress clearly restricts state sovereignty).
172 See, for example, Gade v National Solid Wastes Management Association, 505 US 88, 104
n 2, 108 (1992) (holding that state work safety laws were preempted by a federal statute, even
though states traditionally regulated safety laws and the statute was ambiguous).
173 See Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 SC L Rev
967, 1005-13 (2002) (analyzing cases and arguing that there is no longer an operative presump-
tion against preemption).
174 See O'Reilly, Federal Preemption at 8 (cited in note 149) (noting a study by Kenneth
Davis, which finds that there is no presumption against preemption).
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Courts addressing FLSA preemption are also dismissive of the
presumption against preemption. Several have noted the presumption
at the beginning of their analyses, but have not used it in formulating
their decision.'5 This Comment argues that the presumption still exists
and that courts have at times found it decisive. This presumption
should apply to FLSA preemption cases because of states' traditional
and continuing role in regulating wages and hours and enforcing those
laws.'76 The presumption should be used to resolve the ambiguity dis-
cussed in Part IV.A.
In the "federalism revival" of the 1990s, the Court held that the
federal government must be manifestly clear that it intends to regu-
late in areas of traditional state authority. In Gregory v Ashcroft,'" the
Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
did not preempt a state law requiring state judges to retire at a certain
age.' 8 Determining the qualifications of elected officials is a quintes-
sential area of state authority." Absent a clear statement to the con-
trary, federal law should not be presumed to abrogate state authority in
similar areas.' The Court justified its use of the clear statement prin-
ciple as upholding federalism principles and maintaining the resulting
advantages of: (1) sensitivity to diverse conditions, (2) increased demo-
cratic involvement, (3) state innovation, and (4) state competition. '
More recently, in 2006, the Court applied this principle and held that an
Oregon statute allowing physician-assisted suicide was not preempted
by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) because regulation of the
medical profession is an area of traditional state authority.'"
This presumption against preemption should apply to FLSA
preemption cases. States enacted wage-and-hour laws and enforced them
long before there was a federal wage-and-hour law, making this a tradi-
tional area of state authority. When the FLSA was passed, states contin-
ued to enact wage-and-hour laws and enforce them, showing that the
federal law did not, in practice, completely abrogate state authority in
wage-and-hour regulation. Also, applying the presumption to the FLSA
175 See, for example, Anderson, 508 F3d at 192, 194 (noting the presumption against
preemption at the beginning of the analysis, but then ignoring it and ultimately deciding that the
detailed enforcement provisions decided the case).
176 See Part IV.B.1-2.
177 501 US 452 (1991).
178 Id at 464 (upholding a Missouri mandatory retirement statute for judges).
179 Id at 463 (noting that there exists broad authority that states may select the require-
ments for their judges).
180 Id at 464, citing Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 480 (cited in note 171).
181 Gregory, 501 US at 458.
182 Gonzales v Oregon, 546 US 243, 270 (2006) (recognizing state authority to regulate for
the health and well-being of its citizenry).
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will further the underlying federalism goals. And the usual countervailing
interest in favor of federal preemption-uniformity in the law-does not
apply in this case, strengthening the case for the presumption. 18
1. States traditionally regulate wages and hours.
States regulated wages and hours long before Congress enacted
the FLSA in 1938. Fifteen states, along with Puerto Rico and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, enacted wage-and-hour laws between 1912 and
1923. These laws were enacted during the Lochner era, and many
were ultimately struck down as interfering with the freedom of con-
tract." States also created their own labor departments, which were in
charge of administering and enforcing these laws, long before the fed-
eral government had an equivalent department. The first government
labor organization was the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics
in 1869, and one of the first state labor departments was created in
New York in 1901.i The federal government did not have a cabinet-
level labor department until 1913."'
2. States continued to regulate wages and hours after the FLSA
was enacted.
When Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938, it did so against this
background of traditional state regulation. Congress could have regu-
lated the entire field, but it instead preserved a role for states, explicitly
allowing them to set stricter wage-and-hour regulations.1 And states
have continued to use this power. Numerous states have changed the
minimum wage, modified the overtime rules, provided coverage to
183 See O'Reilly, Federal Preemption at 7 (cited in note 149) (noting the presumption is
stronger in areas where the states traditionally exercised their powers).
184 See Clifford FThies, The First Minimum Wage Laws, 10 Cato J 715,718-19 (1991) (con-
taining a figure showing early minimum wage laws by state or territory).
185 See, for example, Adkins v Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261 US 525,
561 (1923) (striking down a minimum wage statute). Adkins was later overruled by West Coast
Hotel Co v Parrish, 300 US 379,388-401 (1937).
186 Charles F Gettemy, The Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics, 1869-1915: A Sketch of Its
History, Organization and Functions 6-7 (Wright & Potter 1915) (noting that the Massachusetts
Bureau of Labor Statistics was a revolutionary state organization created to investigate working
conditions and served as the precursor to other state and federal labor departments); Press
Release, Governor Spitzer Declares May 2007 Labor History Month: Calls for Strict Enforcement
of New York State's Labor Laws (May 11, 2007), online at
http://www.labor.state.ny.us/pressreleases/20O7/Mayll_2007.htm (visited Sept 1, 2009) (providing
a timeline for the history of New York labor law developments).
187 See Jonathan Grossman, The Origin of the US. Department of Labor, 96 Monthly Labor
Rev 3, 7 (Mar 1973) (noting that President William Howard Taft signed the Department of La-
bor Bill in 1913).
188 29 USC § 218.
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FLSA-exempt employees, and enacted other statutes regulating em-
ployment, like state wage payment laws.'"
States have not only enacted stricter wage-and-hour laws, but
they have also been active in enforcing those laws. Each state has a
labor department in charge of enforcing the state labor laws. The
states cumulatively investigate approximately four times as many
claims as the US Department of Labor.O Also, the states cumulatively
collect approximately 70 percent of what the federal government re-
covers in unpaid wages. '9' These statistics make clear that the states
continue to play a large role in enforcing wage-and-hour laws, ac-
counting for a sizable portion of the total wage-and-hour law enforce-
ment.
3. The presumption furthers the underlying federalism goal of
sensitivity to local circumstances.
The Court in Gregory enumerated the goals of federalism that
the presumption served to advance. '9 While the presumption would
further all four of those goals to some extent, the two primary and
related goals -the need for sensitivity to diverse local labor conditions
and state innovation-are particularly applicable.'" Giving states the
flexibility to modify the procedures and remedies will allow them to
modify the level of private enforcement and thus be more sensitive to
diverse labor conditions. The presumption will ensure that states re-
tain this flexibility unless Congress clearly intends otherwise. Also,
189 See Part I.B.
190 Eighteen state labor departments reported the number of wage-and-hour claims investi-
gated in online annual performance reports. These states reported investigating 42,377 com-
plaints in comparison to the 23,845 investigated by the US Department of Labor. These numbers
were normalized using the populations of the respective reporting states, resulting in 4.12 state
investigations per 1 federal investigation. Data on file with author.
191 Twenty state labor departments reported the amount of unpaid wages collected in an-
nual performance reports. These states reported recovering $60,681,765.87 in comparison to the
$185,287,827 recovered by the US Department of Labor. In per capita amounts, the states recov-
ered approximately $0.42 while the federal government recovered $0.61, leading to the approx-
imate 70 percent figure. Data on file with author. The discrepancy between the states investigat-
ing relatively more claims than the federal government yet recovering less unpaid wages may be
explained by the types of investigations in which the states and the federal government typically
engage. It seems likely that the federal government may take on the larger multi-state investiga-
tions that would be outside a single state labor department's jurisdictional reach. Those larger
investigations likely have a greater amount of wages to collect.
192 See text accompanying notes 178-181 (arguing that federalism results in greater sensitiv-
ity to local conditions, increased democratic participation, innovation among states, and competi-
tion between states).
193 See O'Reilly, Federal Preemption at 8 (cited in note 149) (describing the presumption
against preemption as balancing the competing goals of "centralization and devolution").
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applying the presumption will not interfere with national uniformity,
the primary advantage of federal preemption!"
A state can only modify the level of private enforcement by adjust-
ing the remedies and procedures. Modifying the remedies for wage-and-
hour violations (for example, mandating liquidated damages) changes
the plaintiffs' lawyers' contingency fees."5 Modifying the procedures
(for example, allowing opt-out class actions) changes the cost of bring-
ing suit.'" As previous commentators have noted, the change in class
action procedure is likely to be one of the largest factors in the level of
private enforcement.' Thus by modifying the remedies and procedures,
states change the incentives for private lawyers to bring suit and thus
change the level of private enforcement. Since private enforcement
dominates public enforcement as the means of enforcing wage-and-
hour laws, flexibility to change the levels of private enforcement is very
important to states that desire to change the overall level of wage-and-
hour law enforcement.
Being able to change the level of private enforcement allows
states to be more responsive to diverse labor conditions. States have
different labor conditions, leading to a variation in the optimal level of
wage-and-hour enforcement. Some states contain industries with
chronic violations of wage-and-hour laws. For example, wage-and-
hour violations are pervasive in Southern California's garment facto-
ries, with nearly 70 percent of workers not receiving the minimum
wage. ' These states need to devote extra resources to wage-and-hour
enforcement. They could do so by increasing the levels of public or
private enforcement. But they may prefer to increase the level of pri-
vate enforcement, instead of public enforcement, due to the opportu-
nity cost of devoting a greater percentage of their budget to public
enforcement. Flexibility to change private enforcement levels would
allow states to achieve the desired level of enforcement without sacri-
ficing other public projects.
In addition, the optimal type of wage-and-hour enforcement, such
as the balance of public and private enforcement, may vary among
states. For example, some states have large undocumented worker
194 See id.
195 See text accompanying notes 60-63.
196 If plaintiffs must use an opt-in collective action, they must expend more resources at-
tempting to persuade class members to join the suit. The resulting class size will also be smaller,
so that the fixed costs of bringing suit are distributed over a smaller number of class members.
See text accompanying note 26.
197 See note 26.
198 See note 29.
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populations, which are often the subject of wage-and-hour violations.'
Public enforcement is not effective because undocumented workers
are particularly wary of government employees and will often not be
cooperative.= Some speculate that private enforcement may be a better
mechanism for enforcing wage-and-hour violations among undocu-
mented workers because of the workers' distrust of government em-
ployees."' Other considerations may include whether plaintiffs' firms
capable of investigating and pursuing these large suits exist in the state
and whether the plaintiffs' bar is acting detrimentally to the state's in-
terest by pursuing a kind of employment law "strike suit.' 2 Finally, wage-
and-hour law enforcement is a political issue.2°m Allowing states the flex-
ibility to change the remedies and procedures will allow them to be more
sensitive to local labor conditions and their citizens' preferences.
At the same time, the competing interest of uniformity would not
matter because there is little benefit to increasing uniformity in wage-
and-hour enforcement provisions. The FLSA created a non-uniform
system. It specifically allows states to deviate in substantial ways, such
as providing coverage to FLSA-exempt employees, changing the over-
time rules, or changing the minimum wage. Employers must already
take account of the differences in employment law between states.
The additional cost of accounting for differences in enforcement pro-
visions is likely to be minimal. The FLSA regulatory scheme is unlike
others where national uniformity is a compelling interest. For exam-
199 Southern Poverty Law Center, Under Siege: Life for Low-income Latinos in the South 6-7
(Apr 2009), online at http://www.splcenter.orgflegal/undersiegelUnderSiege.pdf (visited Sept 1,
2009) (reporting that 41 percent of low-income Latinos in the South had been the victim of wage
theft and that the problem was most severe among undocumented workers because employers use
their immigration status against them).
200 See Ending Abuses and Improving Working Conditions for Tomato Workers, Hearings
before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 110th Cong, 2d Sess
(Apr 15, 2008) (testimony of Mary Bauer, Director of the Immigration Justice Project, Southern
Poverty Law Center), online at http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2008 04_15/Bauer.pdf (visited
Sept 1, 2009) (testifying on the lack of legal remedies for migrant workers partly because they
are afraid of deportation and on the effort to encourage private practitioners to investigate
migrant labor violations as a solution). "Most workers told us that they would not consider call-
ing the Department of Labor under any circumstances." Id.
201 Id.
202 Consider Cal Labor Code § 2699.3 (mandating that employees notify the state before
filing a civil action to recover unpaid wages, providing the state an opportunity to intervene on
behalf of the employees and potentially stop disruptive strike suits).
203 See text accompanying notes 31-32.
204 See text accompanying notes 45-48. See also Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sove-
reign States: Preemption and the Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American
Workplace, 62 Fordham L Rev 469, 541-43 (1993) (discussing the federal-state delegation of
authority in employment law).
205 See note 21.
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ple, in Geier v American Honda Motor Co,' it was impractical to al-
low each state to impose its own safety standards on cars because that
would require car manufacturers to adopt the strictest safety standard,
or produce fifty different cars."' Since national uniformity is not a
compelling interest in wage-and-hour enforcement, the presumption
against preemption is strengthened even further.m
C. Applying the Presumption against Preemption to the Three
Preemption Categories
1. The state wage-and-hour law provides greater substantive
rights.
The first category-the state wage-and-hour law provides greater
substantive rights-is the weakest case for preemption, and no court
has ever preempted state law claims in this category. None of the
three indicators of congressional intent suggests that state law claims
should be preempted, making the presumption unnecessary in this
case. First, the plain text (savings clause) explicitly allows states to
enact stricter wage-and-hour regulations, rendering the negative infe-
rence inapplicable. Second, the detailed enforcement provisions of the
FLSA may be unavailable to remedy violations of the stricter state
wage-and-hour law. In some situations, the state wage-and-hour law is
violated, but the FLSA is not. Thus, it would be a stretch to suggest
that detailed enforcement provisions for FLSA violations should be
extended to acts that are not even FLSA violations."' Third, the Por-
tal-to-Portal Act's purpose of creating a "balance" does not prevail.
The state has already imposed greater costs on employers by enacting
a stricter wage-and-hour law, suggesting that the Portal-to-Portal Act's
"balance" does not apply to this situation. The presumption is unne-
cessary, and the state law claims should not be preempted.
2. The state wage-and-hour law is coextensive with the FLSA.
In the second category-the state wage-and-hour law is coexten-
sive with the FLSA-all three indicators of congressional intent point
more strongly towards preemption than in the previous category, but
206 529 US 861 (1993).
207 Id at 881 (stating that state regulations could, in the automotive safety context, be an
"obstacle" to the federal safety goals).
208 See Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 499 (cited in note 171) (noting that the pre-
sumption is weakened if underlying interests are national).
209 See Part II.A.
210 This was why the Williamson court denied preemption of the common law fraud claims.
See text accompanying notes 79-92.
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there is still ambiguity. First, while the negative inference from the
savings clause does apply to this case, there is a plainer meaning: The
savings clause's only function is to allow states to set higher minimum
wages and stricter overtime rules. It does not speak to the preemption
issue at all. Even if this plainer meaning is not persuasive, it places the
negative inference on shaky ground.'
Second, the detailed FLSA enforcement provisions suggest that
coextensive state wage-and-hour laws should be preempted. The de-
tailed enforcement provisions are evidence that Congress intended
those enforcement provisions to be the sole means of enforcing the
FLSA. Congressional intent would be frustrated if an employee were
allowed to enforce the FLSA through a state law claim; the state en-
forcement provisions would effectively replace the FLSA enforce-
ment provisions. The solution is to preempt the state law claims, the-
reby preserving the detailed enforcement provisions. But, another
plausible interpretation is that the detailed enforcement provisions
only apply to FLSA violations. A coextensive state wage-and-hour law
provides independent rights to receive wages, and as a result, the state
law claims are not replacing the FLSA enforcement provisions. The
employee is just choosing not to use the FLSA to recover his unpaid
wages. Thus, the preemptive intent that can be inferred from the de-
tailed enforcement provisions is not a clear statement that Congress
intended to preempt state law.
Third, since states are allowed to impose additional costs on em-
ployers by enacting their own stricter wage-and-hour laws, the Portal-
to-Portal Act's "balance" may not extend to state wage-and-hour laws.
The Portal-to-Portal Act may have only limited employer liability
stemming from federal law violations. The Act may not be decisive
regarding liability stemming from state wage-and-hour law violations.
Since each indicator has a plausible interpretation that suggests
Congress did not intend to preempt state law claims, the presumption
should be used to resolve the dilemma. State law claims are not
preempted when there is a coextensive wage-and-hour law. Courts
should not infer congressional intent to preempt state law in an area that
states have traditionally regulated, absent a clear statement to that effect.
3. The state wage-and-hour law does not exist or it does not apply.
The third category -the state wage-and-hour law does not exist
or it does not apply-is the strongest case for preemption. The only
plausible interpretation for the structure and purpose indicators is
211 See notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
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that Congress intended to preempt state law claims premised on
FLSA violations. First, the structure (detailed enforcement provisions)
evidences Congress's intent to preempt state law claims in this catego-
ry. Unlike the previous cases, a state law claim is necessarily enforcing
a FLSA violation; there is no state wage-and-hour law providing inde-
pendent rights to receive wages. Thus, the FLSA is necessarily the
source of the wages that employees seek to recover. Since all possible
employee claims are recovering FLSA-required wages, FLSA's de-
tailed enforcement provisions must be used.
Second, the Portal-to-Portal Act's purpose was to strike a balance
by limiting employer liability stemming from FLSA violations. Again,
any state law claim in this category is solely a FLSA violation. Allow-
ing different state remedies and procedures would then change the
liability balance for violations of federal law, contrary to congressional
intent. Unlike before, there is no argument that the "balance" does not
extend to liability for violations of state law. Because these two indica-
tions unambiguously point in favor of preemption, the presumption is
unnecessary. State law claims must be preempted when a state wage-
and-hour law does not exist.
D. Applying These Results to the Case Law
As the preceding discussion shows, when addressing a FLSA
preemption issue, courts need to examine the state wage-and-hour law
and determine the type of preemption category. If a state wage-and-
hour law exists, the state law claims should not be preempted because
the state law claims may be enforcing the state wage-and-hour law, not
the FLSA. That is not to say that state law claims are not preempted
whenever there is a state wage-and-hour law. They may be, but not
through federal preemption. Instead, state law claims enforcing state
wage-and-hour laws may only be preempted by state law.
As noted in Part III, many courts have wrongfully ignored the
distinction between claims premised on FLSA violations and those
premised on state wage-and-hour law violations. For example, the
First Circuit in Roman did not allow the plaintiffs to receive the great-
er liquidated damages provided by Maine's state wage payment law."'
The court believed it could not allow these greater damages because
the FLSA specifically set the liquidated damages at a lower amount.
But Maine also had a state wage-and-hour law at least as strict as the
FLSA. ' The state wage payment claim is better understood as provid-
ing remedies for Maine's wage-and-hour law. The court in Lopez
212 See text accompanying notes 106-110.
213 See note 110.
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reached a similar result and held that common law claims were
preempted even though the plaintiff pleaded a state wage-and-hour
law violation. These common law claims should have been deemed
part of the state's enforcement scheme for the state wage-and-hour
law.14 It may be that the common law claims should have been
preempted, but the analysis should have hinged on whether they were
preempted by state law.
In addition, if the analysis above is persuasive, no circuit court has
reached the correct result. The Ninth Circuit's "directly covered" lan-
guage appears to reach the wrong result when there is a coextensive
state wage-and-hour law." In this situation, state law claims would be
"directly covered" by the FLSA-an employee could recover the full
amount of unpaid wages through the FLSA. But, as argued above,
state law claims should not be preempted when there is a coextensive
state wage-and-hour law. On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit and
the Northern District of Iowa have gone too far by allowing state law
claims even if there is no state wage-and-hour law."'
The Fourth Circuit may be the closest to the proposed solution. It
preempted state law claims and suggested that part of the reason was
that no state wage-and-hour law existed."' Perhaps the Fourth Circuit
will eventually hold that state law claims are not preempted so long as
they are premised on a state wage-and-hour law violation. The East-
ern District of North Carolina did subsequently interpret the Fourth
Circuit precedent to mean that state law claims enforcing a coexten-
sive state wage-and-hour law are not preempted.21 8 This suggests that
the Fourth Circuit may ultimately adopt this Comment's conclusion.
CONCLUSION
This Comment addressed a situation in which congressional intent
as to whether state law should be preempted was ambiguous. Both the
detailed enforcement provisions and the Portal-to-Portal Act's purpose
of limiting employer liability suggested that Congress intended that
only the FLSA enforcement provisions could be used to enforce the
FLSA. But, it is not clear that Congress intended to preempt state law
claims enforcing state wage-and-hour laws. Congress may have in-
tended states to be able to set their own enforcement provisions along
with their own state wage-and-hour laws.
214 See text accompanying notes 102-105.
215 See text accompanying note 92.
216 See text accompanying notes 127-34 (discussing Bouaphakeo); text accompanying notes
140-44 (discussing Avery).
217 See text accompanying notes 93-101.
218 See text accompanying notes 135-39.
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This ambiguity is best resolved by a presumption against preemp-
tion. States have historically enacted and enforced their own wage-
and-hour laws. They continue to do so, taking a large role in wage-and-
hour regulation. If Congress intends to interfere with state regulation
and enforcement in this area, it must be clear about its intent. Other-
wise, the benefits of state autonomy will be diminished if courts are
too quick to replace state laws. In this case, those benefits of state au-
tonomy are particularly salient because enforcement of wage-and-
hour laws is an area in which sensitivity to local concerns is important,
and uniformity concerns are minimal. This strengthens the case for the
presumption against preemption. As a result of the presumption, state
law claims should not be preempted as long as a state wage-and-hour
law exists. This is intuitive from the consideration of state autonomy:
states should be able to decide how their own laws are enforced.
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